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Abstract 
Replicated processing with majority voting is a well known method for achieving 
reliability and availability. Triple Modular Redundant (TMR) processing is the most 
commonly used version of that method. Replicated processing requires that the replicas reach 
agreement on the order in which input requests are to be processed. Almost all synchronous 
and deterministic ordering protocols published in the literature are time-based in the sense 
that they require replicas’ clocks to be kept synchronised within some known bound. We 
present a protocol for TMR systems that is based on timeouts and does not require clocks to 
be kept in bounded synchronism. Our design efforts focus on keeping the ordering delays 
small, without unnecessary increase in message overhead. Consequently, we are able to show 
that no symmetric protocol that works only with unsynchronised clocks, can provide a smaller 
worst-case delay. We also demonstrate, through analysis and experiments, that our protocol is 
faster than a time-based one of identical message complexity in certain situations which can 
prevail in many application settings. 
Keywords and Phrases 
Byzantine failures, fault tolerance, Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR), process 
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1. Introduction 
We consider the task of designing and implementing a system that continues to provide 
services in the presence of a bounded number of faulty processors. The weaker the 
assumptions made about a faulty processor’s behaviour, the wider is the set of faults 
tolerated. The weakest fault model known to the fault-tolerant community is the Byzantine 
model [1], and N modular redundant (NMR) processing is one of the most effective ways to 
mask the effects of Byzantine failures [2]. The basic idea here is to use N, N ≥ 3, processors 
in place of a single processor so that failures of at most (N - 1)/2 processors are masked. A 
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Triple modular redundant (TMR) system with N = 3 is the most practical version of an NMR 
system. The three processors of a TMR system execute every given task in parallel and the 
results produced by them are subject to a majority vote. If the voted result is regarded as the 
output from the TMR system, the system functions correctly provided (i) at least two of its 
constituent processors are non-faulty, (ii) all non-faulty ones produce identical results after 
executing any given task, and (iii) the voting performed is correct. 
Process replication within a TMR system assumes the well understood state machine 
model, which imposes two requirements [3] on replicas: they must be deterministic (i.e., the 
execution of an operation in a given state and with a given set of arguments must always 
produce the same result) and they must start in the same state. The second requirement means 
that a message ordering mechanism that presents the input messages to replicas in an identical 
order is necessary. In this paper, we develop an ordering protocol for the authenticated 
Byzantine fault model – perhaps the most well-known sub-class of the Byzantine fault model 
– in which a faulty processor cannot undetectably forge a non-faulty processor’s signature; the 
protocol also assumes the following synchronous environment: (i) communication delays 
between non-faulty processors are bounded by a known constant; (ii) processing and 
scheduling delays within a non-faulty processor can also be bounded; and, (iii) each non-
faulty processor has a local read-only physical clock whose running rate with respect to the 
passage of real time differs from unity by a small and known bound. (Real time is measured 
in an assumed Newtonian time frame that cannot be directly observed.) 
Message ordering in the presence of failures requires the ability to detect late and absent 
messages. In the time-based approach [4], this capability is usually achieved by synchronising 
non-faulty processors’ clocks within some known constant. Since non-faulty processors need 
not have clocks with identical running rates, they should periodically execute a 
synchronisation protocol (e.g., [5, 6]) to adjust their clock readings by appropriate amounts. 
This synchronisation involves (i) periodic exchange of messages, consuming network 
bandwidth, (ii) using data abstractions [7] to adjust the readings of a physical clock (a read-
only object), and (iii) implementing amortisation techniques [8] to avoid sudden jumps in the 
synchronised clock readings. An alternative to building a heavy-weight, synchronised clock 
abstraction is to use timeouts and to employ (unsynchronised) physical clocks only for 
measuring timeouts. We adopt here the timeout-based approach for designing the TMR 
message ordering protocol. Specifically, we derive timeout durations called the timeliness 
bounds to detect late and absent messages; such bounds are derived by taking advantage of 
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the synchronous nature of the TMR system and they remain constant while the system is 
operational.  
The works of [9] and AMp [10] suggest that using timeouts in the synchronous context is 
not something new. One of the designers of AMp analysed time vs. timeout-based approaches 
and observed [11]: though the synchronous, timeout-based protocols cannot be perfect 
substitutes for their time-based counterparts in all circumstances, they can however provide 
attractive alternatives in a number of application settings. We analytically identify, and 
experimentally observe, the situations where our timeout-based protocol is faster than its 
time-based counterpart. Existence of such situations indicates that the protocol presented here 
enhances the tool-kit available to a TMR system builder. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the structure of the 
TMR system, the basic assumptions and the message ordering requirements. Section 3 
develops and presents the protocol. Section 4 outlines the design efforts involved in keeping 
the ordering delays small. Section 5 presents proofs of correctness and also proves that no 
(symmetric) protocol that works only with unsynchronised clocks can guarantee smaller 
worst-case ordering delays. In section 6, we compare the ordering delays in both time and 
timeout based approaches, and identify situations where the timeout protocol performs faster 
than the time-based protocol; our implementation experiments demonstrate that such 
situations are not uncommon in practice. Section 7 concludes the paper after a brief survey on 
related work.  
2. System Description and Assumptions 
The TMR system is made up of processors named Pi, Pj and Pk. These processors are 
uniquely ordered and the ordering is known to them. Each processor is connected directly to 
other two processors of the system by internal links. Also, it is connected to the ‘outside 
world’ or the system environment from which input messages are received and output 
messages are sent to. Figure 1 shows a TMR system whose processors are connected to the 
environment via a bus. The unit (shown as a black square in the figure) that connects a 
processor to the bus is called the network attachment controller (NAC). 
Assumption 1: Within a TMR system, processors fail independent of each other and at 
least 2 processors are non-faulty (and therefore do not fail). 
Assumption 2: The internal links that connect processors do not fail. Within a processor, 
the messages received via each internal link are queued separately before they are processed. 
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A processor is reliably connected to the system environment via a NAC which does not allow 
the attached processor to use the bus continuously for a long time. Thus, if a faulty processor, 
like a “babbling idiot”, transmits randomly generated messages, it cannot overwhelm the 
communication subsystem and prevent a non-faulty processor from receiving another non-
faulty processor’s messages nor from accessing the bus. 
Pi Pk
Pj
µ1 µ2
 
Figure 1. The TMR system. 
Assumption 3: Each processor can sign the messages it sends, and authenticate the 
signed messages it receives [12] such that: 
(a) A non-faulty processor’s signature for a given message is unique and cannot be 
generated by any other processor. 
(b) Any attempt to alter the contents of a non-faulty processor’s signed message is 
detected by any other non-faulty processor. 
These assumptions define the authenticated Byzantine fault model. In the general 
(unauthenticated) Byzantine model, the assumed failure modes are described not by listing 
how a faulty processor is expected to fail but rather by describing a small set of incorrect 
behaviour that are disallowed: a faulty processor cannot (i) make a non-faulty one faulty 
(failure independence), and (ii) overwhelm the communication subsystem with random 
messages and deny a non-faulty processor the capability to communicate with another non-
faulty processor or with the environment. The authenticated model additionally restricts a 
faulty processor’s ability to undetectably impersonate a non-faulty processor (assumption 3). 
Byzantine fault models are regarded to be the weakest since they allow a faulty processor to 
be operated by a malicious adversary who can exercise any combination of permitted failure 
modes to make non-faulty processors order inputs differently. 
The next three assumptions define the synchronous nature of the system. Before stating 
them, we remark that we write, throughout this paper, real time values in Greek letters and 
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clock time values in italicised lower case Roman letters; the term ‘clock’, when not qualified,  
will refer to a processor’s hardware clock. 
Assumption 4: If any non-faulty processor prepares and transmits m at real time τ, any 
non-faulty destination will receive m at real time τ', τ ≤ τ' < τ
 
+ δ, where δ, δ > 0, is a known 
constant. Thus, δ bounds the message queuing delays at the sending and receiving processors, 
and the propagation delay from the sender to a receiver.  
Assumption 5: The clock of any non-faulty processor, say Px, measures a duration of 
length l in real time l(1 + ρx), where |ρx| ≤ ρ and ρ is a known positive constant. (ρ is around 
10-6 for non-faulty processor clocks.) 
Assumption 6: Processing and scheduling delays are bounded and known for any non-
faulty processor; more precisely, any non-faulty processor: i) performs a local computation 
(e.g., processing a received message) within a known amount of time; and, ii) schedules a 
computational task within some known amount of time. 
Remarks: Assuming the synchronous model requires accurate estimation of certain 
bounds that must hold throughout the system operation. Since these bounds are assumed to 
hold for all non-faulty processors, a violation of any of these bounds makes a non-faulty 
processor appear to be behaving like a faulty one; e.g., a violation of assumption 4 means that 
the (non-faulty) sender appears to be faulty to the (non-faulty) receiver. When the fault 
hypothesis (of at most one fault) is thus artificially undermined, processors that correctly 
execute the protocol can end up ordering messages differently. Therefore, adopting the 
synchronous model, be it for time-based or timeout-based approach, requires defining the 
maximum processing and communication load which the system will ever be subject to. This 
could in turn involve assessing the maximum processing load which a valid input can impose 
on processors, and the number of most-demanding inputs which the system has to 
concurrently deal with at any given time. The only alternative to having to determine hard 
bounds on various delays is to opt for the asynchronous model which is briefly described in 
Section 7. 
Note that when the actual system load is less than the maximum defined, the processing, 
the scheduling and communication delays will be smaller than their respective upper bound. 
A question then naturally arises: whether an order protocol can order messages faster when 
the TMR system is lightly loaded. A time-based protocol, by the nature of its design, cannot 
work faster, while a timeout-based can. That is why our protocol works faster than its time-
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based counterpart when certain situations prevail, one of which happens to be a lightly loaded 
TMR. However, for this benefit to manifest, the design efforts, as shown in section 4.3, must 
go farther than those needed for a time-based protocol. (We remark here that the class of 
early-stopping protocols, such as [13, 14], are designed to terminate early not when delays are 
smaller than expected but when fewer failures than expected occur.) 
2.1 Input Message Ordering 
Non-faulty processors can receive input messages in different order. Referring to figure 
1, Pi can receive µ1 followed by µ2 and Pk in the reverse order. So, when a processor 
receives an input message from the system environment, it must first decide the processing 
order for that message. For that, it forms an internal message m that contains the received 
input message in the data field m.µ and sends m to all other processors in the system using the 
order protocol that guarantees the following two conditions: 
Validity: If a non-faulty processor, say Pi, forms and sends m, all non-faulty processors 
(including Pi) decide on an order for m, within a known and bounded real time interval ∆; 
Unanimity: If a non-faulty processor decides on an order for a given m, then every non-
faulty processor decides on the same order for m. 
These conditions ensure that an input µ supplied to a non-faulty P gets identically 
ordered in the form of P’s internal message m, m.µ = µ, by all non-faulty processors of the 
TMR system within ∆. We refer the reader to [15] for details on how a non-faulty processor 
(i) derives an ordered stream of inputs from an ordered stream of internal messages, and (ii) 
generates a voted output from the results it computes. This paper will focus only on the 
(timeout-based) ordering of internal messages. Note that since the TMR system can have at 
most one faulty processor, an input µ must be supplied to at least two processors within the 
system; we will assume that every µ is sent to all three processors in the TMR system.  
3. The protocol 
The protocol has three aspects to it: (i) message counters maintained by processors, (ii) 
message diffusion that enables non-faulty processors to receive each other’s messages, and 
(iii) timeliness checks to assess the timeliness of a received message. All processors execute 
the same version except for processor identities and signatures. The protocol is described for 
Pi which is assumed to be non-faulty throughout the paper. 
3.1. Message Counter and Diffusion 
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Pi maintains a counter called the message counter, denoted as MCi, which holds an 
integer value and is initialised to INIT_VAL (usually 1) when the system is first started. For 
every input µ received from the environment, Pi forms an internal m in the following manner: 
the data field m.µ is set to µ, the originator field m.O to i; the timestamp field m.TS to MCi; 
further, MCi is incremented by 1. Incrementing MCi immediately after timestamping m 
ensures that any message Pi later forms gets a timestamp larger than m.TS. An internal 
message m formed is accepted with its copy being entered into a message list called the 
acceptedi and is then sent to other processors using the send(m) primitive. An invocation of 
this primitive discards m if m.S contains two signatures, and performs the following actions if 
m.S contains no or one signature: signature of Pi for m is generated and appended to any 
signature that may already be in m.S; the signed m is then transmitted to processors in the 
system that have not signed m. Pi receives internal messages from other processors by 
executing the receive(m) primitive which blocks until it can return an authentic m that is 
received via an internal link and has the authentic signatures of one or two distinct processors 
other than Pi. 
Whenever Pi receives m, it checks whether m is timely. (Procedures for checking the 
timeliness of a received message are described in the next sub-section.) If m is found 
untimely, it is discarded; otherwise, the following three actions are performed: (i) MCi is set 
to the maximum of {MCi, m.TS + 1}1, (ii) m is accepted by entering a copy of m into 
acceptedi; and, (iii) send(m) which ensures that if the accepted m had one signature when it 
was received, it is diffused to the processor that appears not to have ‘seen’ m. Note that the 
message diffusion in (iii) is essential to ensure the unanimity condition when one processor 
can be faulty [16]. 
From the description above, it is obvious that: (i) a message sent or received by a non-
faulty processor will have either one or two authentic signatures; and (ii) every sent message, 
but no received message, carries the host processor’s signature. For a given message m, 
path(m) is defined as the ordered sequence of processors that have signed m. Thus, if m is a 
double-signed message that is formed by Pj and diffused by Pk, then path(m) = Pj:Pk. The 
first processor in path(m) is called the originator of m and the last processor the immediate 
                                            
1
 A faulty processor can give arbitrarily large m.TS to messages it forms and sends, and thereby cause MCi to 
wrap around frequently. The water-mark scheme of [17] can be used to restrict this incorrect behaviour.  
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sender of m. Note that the originator and the immediate sender of m are one and the same if 
m is single-signed. Two paths are said to intersect if they contain one or more processors in 
common. 
3.2. Timeliness Checks 
These checks enable a processor to determine the timeliness of a received m. Before 
presenting them, we will define a clock time interval d such that by measuring d in its local 
clock a non-faulty processor is guaranteed to measure a real time interval of at least δ 
duration, i.e., d ≥ δ/(1 - ρ); d is known to, and identical for all non-faulty processors of the 
system. We will assume, for simplicity, that a processor takes zero time to execute any 
instruction of the protocol and the send(m) and receive(m) primitives. (Realising this 
assumption in practice will require an increase in the value of d, which is possible as the 
protocol does not impose any upper bound on the value of d.) 
Suppose that Pi receives a message m at its local clock time ti. There can arise one of 
three possible situations depending on the value of MCi at ti: MCi < m.TS or MCi = m.TS or 
MCi > m.TS. If MCi < m.TS or MCi = m.TS then m is a ‘future’ or a ‘present’ message 
respectively and is considered by Pi as timely; if, on the other hand, MCi is already larger 
than m.TS when m is being received, then m is a ‘past’ message, and its timeliness should be 
judged based on how much time has elapsed since MCi first became larger than m.TS. So, 
timeliness checks are needed only for messages received with past timestamps. Let us 
suppose that the m received at ti is a past message. Let m’ be the message whose acceptance 
by Pi caused MCi to become larger than m.TS for the first time. That is, just before Pi 
accepted m’, MCi ≤ m.TS. So, m’.TS ≥ m.TS must be true. Note that m’ could have been 
formed by any processor including Pi, therefore path(m’) can be any one of Pi, Pj, Pk, Pj:Pk 
or Pk:Pj. Let Pi accept m’ at its clock time ti’, ti’ < ti. For m to be considered timely, (ti - ti’) 
must be less than a fixed bound, called the timeliness bound, whose value depends on 
path(m’) and path(m). Table 1 summarises these timeliness bounds for all combinations of 
path(m’) and path(m). For example, if m’ is a single signed message from Pk and m is a 
single signed message from Pj, then the entry B2 (row B, column 2) indicates that (ti - ti’) 
must be less than 2d for Pi to consider m timely. We will denote an entry of Table 1 by 
treating the table as a matrix: Table1[pr, pc] denotes the value in the row corresponding to the 
path pr and in the column corresponding to the path pc. 
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 path(m) 
path(m’) 
Pk (1) Pj (2) Pj:Pk (3) Pk:Pj (4) 
Pi           (A) 2d 2d 4d 4d 
Pk          (B) d 2d 3d 3d 
Pj           (C) 2d d 3d 3d 
Pj:Pk      (D) d d 2d 3d 
Pk:Pj      (E) d d 3d 2d 
Table 1: Pi’s timeliness bounds for a past m given that MCi first exceeded m.TS due to accepting m’. 
3.3. Protocol Description 
To perform the timeliness checks on received messages, Pi maintains path counters, 
denoted as PCi[p], for every path p through which Pi can receive a message. These counters 
are initialised to (INIT_VAL - 1) and are updated at appropriate times using two primitives: an 
invocation of update(path: p, timestamp: T) sets PCi[p] = maximum of {PCi[p], T}; schedule 
update(p,T) at t schedules update(p,T) to be invoked at (local) clock time t, if t is a future 
time when the schedule instruction is executed. 
Whenever Pi forms and sends m’ or receives a timely m’, updates are scheduled to set 
PCi[p] = maximum of {PCi[p], m’.TS}, for every p ∈ {Pj, Pk, Pj:Pk, Pk:Pj}, after the elapse 
of time intervals indicated in Table1[path(m’), p]. Thus, the timeliness of a received m can be 
checked simply by referring to PCi[path(m)]: m is timely only if m.TS > PCi[path(m)] when 
m was received. Putting it differently, a received m is not timely if PCi[path(m)] ≥ m.TS  
when m was received. Let PCi,min denote the minimum of the path counter values at any 
time, and its current value be T. From the moment PCi,min becomes T, the set of messages in 
acceptedi which have the timestamp of T cannot expand in its size; that is, this set has 
stabilised and is denoted as stablei(T).  
To perform message ordering, entries of stablei(T) are first stripped of their signatures, 
and then duplicate entries are discarded. Two messages m and m’ are said to be spurious if 
m.O = m’.O, m.TS = m’.TS and m.µ ≠ m’.µ. Spurious messages are generated when the faulty 
processor gives the same timestamp to distinct messages m and m’ it forms. Spurious 
messages in stablei(T) are discarded. After this pruning, stablei(T) contains at most one 
message originating from a given processor. Messages of stablei(T) are ordered (i) according 
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to their source processors, and (ii) only after the contents of all stablei(T’), T’ < T, have been 
ordered. To ensure (ii), a stability counter, denoted as SCi and initialised to (INIT_VAL - 1), 
is used. The protocol (for Pi) is presented in figure 2.  
4. Estimating Timeliness Bounds 
Central to protocol design is the estimation of timeliness bounds which need to be (i) as 
small as possible for message ordering to be fast, and (ii) large enough to ensure that the 
validity and unanimity conditions can be realised. This section describes how we meet these 
competing requirements. It is done in three parts. 
 do /* Broadcast process: handles external messages */ 
  get µ from outside the system; 
  m.µ = µ; m.TS = MCi; m.O = i; 
  MCi = MCi + 1; 
  t = clocki; 
  for every p ∈ {Pj, Pk, Pj:Pk, Pk:Pj} do 
   schedule update(PCi[p], m.TS) at t + Table1[Pi, p]; 
  end for 
  send(m); 
  acceptedi = acceptedi ∪ {m}; 
 end do /* Broadcast process */ 
 || 
 do /* Diffuse process: handles internal messages */ 
  receive(m); 
  if (m.TS ≤ PCi[path(m)]) then discard(m) 
  else 
   MCi = maximum of {MCi, m.TS + 1}; 
   t = clocki; 
   for every p ∈ {Pj, Pk, Pj:Pk, Pk:Pj} do 
    schedule update(PCi[p], m.TS) at t + Table1[path(m), p]; 
   end for 
   send(m); 
   acceptedi = acceptedi ∪ {m}; 
  end if 
 end do /* Diffuse process */ 
 || 
 do /* Order process: identifies and orders stable messages */ 
  PCi,min = minimum of {PCi[p], ∀ p | p ∈ {Pj, Pk, Pj:Pk, Pk:Pj}}; 
  while SCi ≤ PCi,min do 
   SCi = SCi + 1; 
   stablei = {m | m ∈ acceptedi and m.TS = SCi}; 
   acceptedi = acceptedi - stablei; /* remove stable messages */ 
   if stablei ≠ ∅ then  
    distinct = ∅; 
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    for every m in stablei do 
     m.S = ∅; /* strip off signatures from m */ 
     if m ∉ distinct then insert m in distinct end if 
    end for 
    stablei = distinct; 
    spurious = {m, m’|m ∈ stablei ∧ m’∈ stablei ∧ m’.O=m.O ∧  m’µ≠m.µ}; 
    stablei = stablei - spurious; /* remove spurious messages */ 
    if stablei≠∅ then ∀ m|m ∈ stablei deliver m ordered by m.O end if 
   end if 
  end while 
 end do /* Order process */ 
Figure 2. The Timeout-based Protocol for Message Ordering. 
First, the basic condition that should be met for the protocol to be correct is stated. We 
then analyse how meeting this condition is made difficult by various possible failure modes of 
the faulty processor; this analysis leads to the identification of a requirement for meeting the 
basic condition. 
The third part is on estimating timeliness bounds which meet that requirement and is 
done in two stages. First, we derive the bounds in a manner that is typically employed in 
designing time-based protocols. This results in what we call the ‘conservative’ bounds. Next, 
these bounds are reduced, which leads to smaller worst-case ordering delay. 
4.1. The Basic Condition 
The following condition must be met for identical ordering by non-faulty processors: 
Unanimous acceptance: m enters the accepted list of a non-faulty processor if and only 
if m or a message equivalent to m enters the accepted list of every other non-faulty processor. 
A message equivalent to m is denoted as equiv(m) and is defined as a message that differs 
from m only in its signature field; that is, equiv(m).µ = m.µ, equiv(m).O = m.O, equiv(m).TS = 
m.TS and equiv(m).S ≠ m.S. For every accepted m, (non-faulty) Pi can receive at most one 
equiv(m). Note that equiv(m) and m become identical once their signatures are stripped off 
(i.e., once the signature fields are set to ∅). 
If the above condition holds, then non-faulty processors will construct an identical 
stable(T) of signature-stripped and non-spurious messages for every given T, T ≥ INIT_VAL. 
Given that processor ordering is unique and known to non-faulty processors, the order 
determined by them for any (signature-stripped) m will be identical. 
4.2. Effects of Failures 
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A faulty processor, say Pj, can attempt to prevent the above condition from being met, by 
failing in the following ways. 
F1 (impersonating a non-faulty processor): Pj generates a signed message on behalf of 
Pi and attempts to deceive Pk into accepting the forged message. 
F2 (delayed sending of own messages): Pj delays the sending of a message m it generates, 
with the consequence that one non-faulty processor, say Pi, finds m timely and Pk does not. 
This situation, depicted in figure 3(a), has the effect of m entering acceptedi but not 
acceptedk.  
Pj 
Pk Pi 
Untimely m 
Pj 
Pk 
Diffusion 
failure Timely m 
 m 
Pi 
 b)  a) 
 m 
 
Figure 3. Pj’s failures of types F2 and F4. 
F3 (two-facing while sending own messages): Pj sends a properly signed m to, say, Pi, 
and sends to Pk either (a) an inauthentic version of m, or (b) nothing, or (c) a different, 
authentic message m’ (that is never sent to Pi). The effect of a two-facing failure is the same 
as the previous category: a 1-signed message enters the accepted list of only one non-faulty 
processor. 
F4 (failure during diffusion): Pj fails while diffusing a message m which it received 
from, say, Pi as shown in figure 3(b). It can fail by altering the contents of m (call this failure 
type F4.1) or by delaying the diffusion by an arbitrary amount of time (call this type F4.2). 
Assumption 3 reduces the impact of F1 and F4.1 into Pk detecting and discarding Pj’s 
tampered message as not authentic. F4.2 can result in Pk not receiving the diffused message 
at all, or receiving it but finding it untimely. Thus, Pj’s failures of types F2, F3, and F4.2 can 
cause Pj’s m not to be accepted by one non-faulty processor while m or equiv(m) is being 
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accepted by another. Despite this, the condition of unanimous acceptance needs to be satisfied 
through message diffusion which is feasible if the following requirement is met: 
Unanimous acceptance requirement: a non-faulty processor finds a received m timely 
if the immediate sender of m is non-faulty. 
Suppose that the above requirement is met. In case of F2 and F3 type failures, if the 1-
signed m sent by faulty Pj enters acceptedi but not acceptedk, then the equiv(m) diffused by 
Pi will be accepted by Pk; Pj’s failures of type F4.2 are made irrelevant since m sent by non-
faulty Pi is assured to enter acceptedk.  
4.3. Derivation of Timeliness Bounds 
As per the protocol, whenever Pi accepts m, MCi is immediately set to maximum of 
{MCi, m.TS+1}, while PCi[p], for every path p ∈ {Pk, Pj, Pj:Pk, Pk:Pj}, is set to maximum 
of {PCi[p], m.TS} after some time.  So, MCi > PCi[p] is always true for any path p. This 
means that when a received m is a future or present message (i.e., MCi ≤ m.TS), it is found 
timely (i.e., PCi[p] < m.TS) and therefore the unanimous acceptance requirement is trivially 
met. So, in what follows, we show that the timeliness bounds of Table 1 meet the above 
requirement when a received m is a past one. 
We will present our derivations in the context in which the bounds of Table 1 are 
presented: Pi is non-faulty and accepts m’ at its clock time ti’ and receives m, m.TS ≤ m’.TS, 
at ti, ti > ti’; just before ti’, MCi ≤ m.TS, and at ti’ MCi > m’.TS. To keep the derivation 
simple, we assume the following. (i) The minimum message transmission delay (as measured 
by a non-faulty clock) is zero. (ii) The clocks of all non-faulty processors have an identical 
running rate; so, d = δ/(1-ρi). (This assumption is removed in subsection 4.3.3.) (iii) Unless 
stated explicitly, time is measured according to the clock of Pi. So, when we say an event 
happened at (time) t, it means that the event happened at time t according to Pi’s clock. (iv) 
Finally, the subscript i is dropped from ti and ti’, where the context is obvious.  
4.3.1. Conservative bounds 
Lemma 4.1. Given that Pi accepts m’ at t’, any non-faulty Px will have MCx > m’.TS 
before t’+ d. 
Proof: If Px has signed m’, then MCx > m’.TS when it signed m’. Since Px’s signing of 
m’ has to be prior to Pi accepting m’, the lemma is true. If Px has not signed m’, it will 
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receive the diffused equiv(m’) from Pi before t’ + d. Upon the reception of m’, if MCx ≤ 
equiv(m’).TS then equiv(m’) will be seen by Px as a present or future message, and therefore 
must be accepted which will then set MCx > m’.TS.       
Say, non-faulty Pk forms and sends m, m.TS ≤ m’.TS. By Lemma 4.1, MCk becomes 
larger than m’.TS before t’ + d. So, m
 
should have been sent by Pk before t’ + d. Even if m 
experiences the maximum delay of just less than d time, Pi should receive Pk’s single-signed 
m before t’ + 2d. It suggests that if Pi receives a single-signed message m at t such that 
(t - t’) < 2d, it must consider m timely. This scenario is depicted in figure 4(a) where time 
progresses from left to right and the labels “>m’.TS” and “=m.TS+1” indicate the earliest 
instances when a non-faulty message counter exceeds m’.TS and when it becomes equal to 
m.TS + 1, respectively; “<nd” labels an interval of length less than nd, for some integer n ≥ 1. 
On the time-line of Pk (in figure 4(a)), the timing instance labelled “=m.TS+1” cannot be on 
the right hand side of that labelled “>m’.TS” since m.TS ≤ m’.TS. So, Pi can receive a timely 
m from Pk at t, (t - t’) < 2d. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. (a) Non-faulty Pk forms and sends m. (b) Pk diffuses Pj’s m. 
Suppose that m originates from a faulty Pj and that Pk receives it within 2d time after 
MCk > m’.TS has become true. (See figure 4(b).) 
Just like in figure 4(a) where Pi accepts Pk’s m because m arrives within 2d time after 
MCi > m’.TS, Pk must now consider Pj’s m timely. (Note that a non-faulty processor cannot 
know whether another processor is non-faulty or faulty.) When Pk diffuses m, Pi must find 
the diffused message timely for the unanimous acceptance requirement to be met. From figure 
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4(b), Pi can receive the diffused m at t, t < t’ + 4d. So, Pi’s timeliness check for accepting a 
double signed m is (t - t’) < 4d. 
4.3.2. Reducing the conservative bounds: why and how? 
Let us evaluate ∆ had the conservative bounds been used as such. Consider the following 
scenario: Pi receives and accepts 1-signed m’ from non-faulty Pk at time t’. Pi would have to 
wait until t’ + 2d and t’ + 4d to deduce that it would no longer accept a 1-signed m and a 2-
signed m, m.TS ≤ m’.TS, respectively. That is, Pi could not stabilise m’ no earlier than t’ + 4d. 
Say, Pk sends m’ at t’k, t’k ≤ t’ ≤ t’k +δ. So, the delay (measured from t’k) for Pi to order m’ 
could be at most  δ +4d. The maximum delay for Pk to order its own m’ is 4 d. Thus, ∆, the 
maximum ordering delay, would have to be  δ +4 d. Interestingly, the case which decides ∆ is 
Pi ordering m’, m’.O ≠ Pi; it turns out that if m’.O ≠ Pi, the conservative timeliness bounds 
can be reduced, permitting Pi to stabilise m’ at t’ + 3d itself, resulting in a smaller ∆ = 4 d. 
Below, we present the intuition behind this reduction. 
Suppose that Pi has received and accepted m’ at t’, and that Pi ≠ m’.O = Pk (say). Pi can 
now expect any of Pk’s 1-signed m, m.TS < m’.TS, to be received before t’+ d, if Pk is non-
faulty. (Note: the unanimous acceptance requirement needs to be met only when Pk, the 
immediate sender of m, is non-faulty.) This is because, non-faulty Pk sends the messages it 
forms, in the increasing order of message timestamps; Pi must receive the earlier one within 
at most d after it has received the later one. So, the conclusion is: given that m’ is accepted at 
t’, the timeliness bound for a 1-signed m such that m.TS ≤ m’.TS and the originator of m’ ≡ 
originator of m ≠ Pi, is only d (see entries B1 and E1 of Table 1), and need not be 2d which is 
the conservative bound for any 1-signed m. 
Observe that we achieved the above reduction (for two particular cases) by considering 
the slowest possible behaviour of an unknown m whose immediate sender is non-faulty and 
m.TS ≤ m’.TS; further, we also made use of two facts: (i) m’.O ≠ Pi, and (ii) path(m’) 
intersects with path(m). It turns out that whenever (i) and (ii) hold, reduction is possible. 
Intuitively, the latest arrival time of the unknown m can be estimated more precisely, if m and 
the accepted m’ are handled by the same processor. Because there are only three processors in 
the TMR system, path(m’) and path(m) always intersect if m is 2-signed and m’.O ≠ Pi. 
Furthermore, if path(m’) and path(m) have only one common processor, then that processor 
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does not have to be non-faulty for reduction to be feasible. Suppose that Pj is faulty. The only 
path combination for which path(m’) and path(m) intersect only at Pj is: path(m’) = Pj and 
path(m) = Pj: Pk, given that the immediate sender of m (i.e., Pk) has to be a non-faulty one. 
Appendix A argues that the bound for this path combination is 3d as indicated by the entry C3 
of Table 1. With reduced bounds in use, Pi, after having accepted m’ at t’, can conclude by t’ 
+ 3d that it would no longer accept any m whose immediate sender is non-faulty and m.TS ≤ 
m’.TS, i.e., it can stabilise m’ no later than t’ + 3d. 
Using arguments similar to those used in Appendix A, we have reduced many other 
bounds, all of which are indicated by those entries of Table 1 that are neither 2d nor 4d, and 
by entries D3 and E4 which have 2d for a double-signed m. These arguments are shown in 
[18]. 
4.3.3. Accounting for non-identical clock rates 
We now remove the following simplifying assumption made earlier: clocks of all non-
faulty processors have a known, identical running rate. Recall that d was defined in Section 
3.2 to be the clock time interval such that by measuring d in its local clock a non-faulty 
processor is guaranteed to have measured a real time interval of at least δ. Since the running 
rate of any non-faulty clock can differ from unity by at most ρ (assumption 5), it is enough to 
set d = δ/(1- ρ) = d1 (say), if all non-faulty clocks had the same unknown running rate. We 
argue below that the effects of non-identical running rates of non-faulty clocks are 
compensated for, when d1 is increased to d1(1+2ρ)(1+2ρ).  
Suppose that all processors start measuring d1 from the same real-time instance by 
referring to their respective local clocks. If non-faulty clocks had been running at an identical 
rate, then every given non-faulty processor deduces the following two facts when it completes 
measuring d1. Fact-1: every other non-faulty processor has completed measuring d1, and fact-
2: every non-faulty processor deduces that every other non-faulty processor has completed 
measuring d1. By assumption 5, non-faulty clocks can drift apart at the maximum rate of 2ρ. 
So, a non-faulty processor must measure d2 = d1(1+2ρ) in its clock to ascertain that every 
other non-faulty processor must have measured at least d1. That is, every non-faulty processor 
must measure d2 in its clock to be able to deduce fact-1. Similarly, to be able to deduce fact-2, 
a duration d3 = d2(1+2ρ) must be measured in the local clock.  More precisely, only after 
measuring d3 in its local clock, a given non-faulty processor, say Pi, can (i) ascertain that 
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every other non-faulty processor, say Pk, must have measured at least d2 and (ii) deduce that 
Pk would have deduced fact-1. 
If we ignore the terms containing the second and higher order powers of ρ, we can write 
d3 = d1/(1-4ρ) = δ/(1 - 5ρ). Thus, choosing d ≥ d3 = δ/(1 - 5ρ) will account for non-identical 
running rates of non-faulty clocks.  
5. Protocol Correctness and Optimality Result 
Lemma 5.1: The protocol guarantees the validity condition with ∆ = 4d(1 + ρ), provided 
d ≥ δ/(1 - 5ρ). 
Proof: Consider an execution of the protocol in which Pi and Pk are non-faulty. Let Pi 
form and send a message m at real-time τi. Pk receives m before τi + δ (by assumption 4). The 
arguments of Section 4.3 indicate that the timeliness bounds of Table 1 satisfy the unanimous 
acceptance requirement when d ≥ δ/(1 - 5ρ). (For a formal proof of correctness, see Appendix 
C.) So, Pk will find the received m timely and accept it. Note that when a non-faulty 
processor accepts a message m, none of its path counters stays below m.TS after some finite 
time. So, the message m accepted by Pi and Pk, will be taken up for ordering and be ordered 
because a faulty processor cannot form and send another message that could make Pi and Pk 
consider m as spurious (due to assumption 3). This shows that the validity condition is met 
within a finite time after τi. 
The schedule instructions in the Broadcast process indicate that PCi,min reaches m.TS 
within 4d clock time after τi. So, Pi orders m no later than τi + 4d(1 + ρi). The schedule 
instructions in the Diffuse process indicate that PCk,min reaches m.TS within 3d clock time 
after Pk receives m which is before τi + δ. So, Pk orders m no later than τi + δ + 3d(1 + ρk). 
Thus the message m sent by Pi gets ordered by Pi and Pk, no later than τi + maximum of 
{4d(1 + ρi), δ + 3d(1 + ρk)}. By assumption 5, |ρi| ≤ ρ and |ρk| ≤ ρ. So, ∆ = maximum of 
{4d(1 + ρ), δ + 3d(1 + ρ)} = 4d(1 + ρ). Hence the lemma.      
Let Stablei(T), for some T, T ≥ INIT_VAL, denote the set stablei which non-faulty Pi first 
constructs during an execution of the protocol when SCi = T. The code for the Order process 
indicates that (a1) Pi strips off signatures of every m in Stablei(T) and removes duplicates; 
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and then, (a2) it removes spurious messages from Stablei(T). Let SigFreei(T) and SpuFreei(T) 
denote the resulting Stablei(T) after a1 and a2 are carried out, respectively:  
Definition 5.1: SigFreei(T) = {m | m ∈ Stablei(T) ∧ m.S = ∅}. 
Definition 5.2: SpuFreei(T) = {m|m∈SigFreei(T) ∧ (¬∃m’∈ SigFreei(T):  m.O=m’.O)}. 
Lemma 5.2: Consider an execution of the protocol in which Pi and Pk are non-faulty. 
Suppose that: m ∈ Stablei(T) ⇒ equiv(m) ∈ Stablek(T), and m ∈ Stablek(T) ⇒ equiv(m) 
∈ Stablei(T). Then, SpuFreei(T) = SpuFreek(T).  
Proof: In reducing Stablei(T) to SigFreei(T), Pi empties the m.S field of every m in 
Stablei(T) and then discards duplicates. m and equiv(m) are distinguished only by their 
signature fields, and setting this field to empty will make them identical. (See the definition of 
equiv(m) in Section 4.1.) If Stablei(T) contains m and equiv(m), the duplicate removal ensures 
that only one of the identical copies is retained in SigFreei(T). So, by the hypothesis of the 
lemma, SigFreei(T) = SigFreek(T). Contrary to lemma, assume that SpuFreei(T) ≠ 
SpuFreek(T); also assume that, without loss of generality, there is an m such that m 
∈ SpuFreei(T) and m ∉ SpuFreek(T). By Definition 5.2, SpuFreei(T) ⊆ SigFreei(T). We have 
established that SigFreei(T) = SigFreek(T). So, m ∈ SigFreek(T). But m ∉ SpuFreek(T); so, 
by Definition 5.2, there must have been an m’ in SigFreek(T) such that m.O  =  m’.O. Since 
SigFreei(T)  = SigFreek(T), m’ ∈ SigFreei(T). By Definition 5.2, m cannot be in SpuFreei(T). 
Hence the lemma.           
Lemma 5.3: The protocol guarantees the unanimity condition, provided d ≥ δ/(1 - 5ρ). 
Proof: Consider an execution of the protocol in which Pi and Pk are non-faulty. Say, Pi 
accepts some m’. If m’ is signed by Pk, then equiv(m’) is already accepted by Pk. If m’ is not 
signed by Pk, then Pi will sign and diffuse m’ to Pk. Since the timeliness bounds of Table 1 
satisfy the unanimous acceptance requirement when d ≥ δ/(1 - 5ρ), Pk will accept the diffused 
message. Thus, for every m’ accepted by Pi, Pk accepts equiv(m’). Observe (from figure 2) 
that a non-faulty processor accepts no m, m.TS ≤ T, once its stability counter (SC) becomes 
equal to T, T ≥ INIT_VAL. So, for every m’ accepted by Pi, Pk should accept equiv(m’) before 
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SCk becomes equal to m’.TS. Therefore, for any T ≥ INIT_VAL, when Pi and Pk form 
Stablei(T) and Stablek(T) respectively: m ∈ Stablei(T) ⇒ equiv(m) ∈ Stablek(T). 
By similar arguments, we can show: m” ∈ Stablek(T) ⇒ equiv(m”) ∈ Stablei(T). By 
Lemma 5.2, SpuFreei(T) = SpuFreek(T) = SpuFree(T) (say) for every T ≥ INIT_VAL. By 
Definition 5.2, SpuFree(T) will contain at most one message originating from a given 
processor. Since processor ordering is unique and known, Pi and Pk will order the entries of 
SpuFree(T) identically. Further, entries of SpuFree(T) are ordered only after the entries of all 
SpuFree(T’), T’ < T, have been ordered. So, Pi orders m’ before m if and only if Pk orders m’ 
before m. Thus the protocol satisfies the unanimity condition.     
Theorem 5.1: The protocol guarantees unanimity and validity conditions with ∆ = 4d(1 
+ ρ), provided d ≥ δ/(1 - 5ρ). 
Proof: Follows from Lemmas 5.1 and 5.3. 
5.1. Optimal Upper Bound 
We next show that the ordering bound of our protocol is the smallest achievable when (i) 
clocks are not synchronised, (ii) ordering is symmetric, and (iii) a processor cannot deduce 
temporal order between concurrent messages it receives. Each of these premises is defined 
below. 
Unsynchronised Clocks: Non-faulty processors’ clocks are not synchronised, where clock 
is a device which a processor uses for observing time. To state formally, let ci(τ) denote the 
reading of Pi’s clock at real time τ. Clocks of non-faulty Pi and Pj are said to be 
unsynchronised during an interval ι if |ci(τ) - cj(τ)| is arbitrary for every τ in ι.  
Symmetric Ordering: Our protocol, like [20], is symmetric in the sense that the correct 
processors run the same program (except for process identities and signatures). In contrast, in 
an asymmetric protocol (e.g. [9]), correct processors can execute different code and hence 
play different roles: one processor, termed the sequencer, decides and disseminates the 
message ordering for other processors to accept what it has decided. In failure-free 
executions, asymmetric ordering will be the fastest if the non-sequencer processors can 
confirm the sequencer’s correct behaviour without delaying message ordering; such delay-
free confirmation is possible only when the sequencer is guaranteed to fail in a benign manner 
(e.g. by crashing). However, when (authenticated) Byzantine failures are permitted, the non-
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sequencer processors must exchange messages to confirm that the sequencer had behaved 
correctly so far; that is, message diffusion must precede message ordering. Further, when the 
sequencer fails, message ordering is delayed until the failure is detected and a new sequencer 
is elected. Though not proved here, it appears that asymmetric ordering cannot offer a better 
worst-case ordering delay. 
Non-deducibility of Temporal Order: Based on the definition of ‘happened before’ in 
[21], we define two messages to be concurrent if and only if neither one can be said to have 
happened before the other. Temporal order on messages is an order that is based on the 
Newtonian time instants at which messages were generated: for any two messages in the 
system, one message is before another in the temporal order if the first one was generated 
earlier in a Newtonian time-frame (see [22] for a formal definition). We assume that no 
processor can deduce temporal order between messages that are concurrent in the sense of 
[21]2.  
For simplicity we will assume ρ = 0 and consider a system in which communication 
delays between two non-faulty processors can be anything between 0 and δm, 0 < δm < δ.  
Let δm- be a value such that δm- < δm and (δm - δm-) is infinitely small. 
Theorem 5.2: Any symmetric ordering protocol that works only with unsynchronised 
clocks, will have executions in which the ordering delay can be 3δm + δm-. 
Proof: By contradiction. Shown in Appendix B.      
By Theorem 5.2, the upper bound ∆ on ordering delays must be at least (3δm + δm-), i.e. 
∆ ≥ (3δm + δm-). Since δm is not known directly, but only its upper bound δ (see assumption 
4), ∆ ≥ 4δ. Theorem 5.1 establishes ∆ of our protocol to be 4d(1 + ρ) with d recommended to 
be d ≥ δ/(1 - 5ρ). When d is chosen to be δ/(1-5ρ), we have ∆ ≈ 4δ, if we assume (1+ρ)/(1-5ρ) 
≈ 1. 
6. Comparison with Time-Based Approach 
Let non-faulty processors’ clocks be synchronised within e: at any given real time 
instance τ, if a non-faulty processor’s synchronised clock reads T then any other non-faulty 
processor’s synchronised clock reads T' such that T-e ≤ T' ≤ T+e where e is a known constant.  
                                            
2
 According to [21], two messages need not be produced at the same newtonian time, for them to be deemed 
concurrent. 
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According to the classical time-based ordering protocol of [20], when (non-faulty) Pi 
forms and broadcasts a message m, it sets m.TS to the current reading of its synchronised 
clock; Pi or any other non-faulty Px stabilises an accepted m at its local synchronised time 
m.TS + 2(d + e). So, if Pi has broadcast m at real time τ, then it orders m at real-time τ + 2(d + 
e)(1 + ρi). (To simplify the comparison of the two approaches, we will assume that the 
running rate of the synchronised clock of any non-faulty Px is the same as that of Px's 
physical clock.) At τ, the synchronised clock of any non-faulty Px, x ≠ i, could be reading a 
value between m.TS-e and m.TS+e. So, Px will order m at some real time in the interval 
[τ + (2d + e)(1 + ρx), τ + (2d + 3e)(1 + ρx)], depending on whether Px’s synchronised clock 
is ahead of or behind Pi’s. So, in the best case when every non-faulty synchronised clock is 
ahead of the non-faulty transmitter’s synchronised clock by e, the upper bound on time-based 
ordering delays ∆time is maximum of {2(d +e)(1+ρi), (2d + e)(1 + ρx)}. Thus, ∆time is 2(d + 
e)(1 + ρ) in the best case and is (2d + 3e)(1 + ρ) in the worst case.  
The value of e depends on how frequently clocks are adjusted and on the algorithm used 
to compute the adjustment. The latter can be either an 
 external synchronisation algorithm which requires a reliable time source (e.g. global 
positioning system (GPS)) to which processors are reliably connected [6], or an 
 internal synchronisation algorithm which does not require any external assistance. It 
can be run entirely in hardware [5], or by software processes with specific hardware 
assistance as in MARS [23], or by software processes without any special hardware support.  
In external, hardware based, or specialised-hardware assisted approaches, e obtained is 
very small (in the order of picoseconds) compared to d (which can be in the order of 
milliseconds). Thus, ∆time is effectively 2d, i.e., one half of the ordering delay ∆ of the timeout 
approach. However, these approaches involve the use of specific devices or components 
which may not always be available to a system builder; in those circumstances, software 
implementation of an internal synchronisation algorithm using commercial, off-the-shelf 
(COTS)  processors and operating systems is the only available option which we will focus 
on, in what follows. 
Among the internal synchronisation protocols in the literature, the deterministic, and 
authenticated Byzantine fault-tolerant protocols of [24, 25, 26] are suitable for our TMR 
system and fault model. Among the rest which yield small e, some, such as [6], assume a 
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stronger fault model (of bounded omission failures), while others, such as [27] and the first 
two protocols in [25], assume a weaker fault model of unauthenticated Byzantine faults but 
are not appropriate for a TMR system as they require the system to have four processors. 
In comparing ∆time with ∆, we will make another simplifying assumption, favouring the 
time based approach: e is taken to be the maximum clock difference immediately after 
adjustments were made; i.e. we ignore a component of e which accounts for clock drift until 
next adjustment. Thus, the value of e turns out to be δ/(1+ρ) and (1+5ρ)δ/(1+ρ) when [24] 
and [26] are used to compute the adjustment respectively. (The authenticated protocol of [25] 
is considerably less efficient than [24].) In our calculations, we will take e= δ/(1+ρ) and, with 
no serious loss of accuracy, ignore the terms containing second and higher order powers of ρ; 
this approximation will enable us to write, for example, e = δ/(1+ρ) = δ(1-ρ). 
(∆time - ∆) for the best case of  ∆time becomes: 2(d + e)(1 + ρ) - 4d(1 + ρ) =  2(1 + ρ) 
[δ(1+ρ) + δ(1-ρ)] – 4(1 + ρ) [δ(1+5ρ)]. After some algebra, (∆time - ∆) = -20δρ. 
In the worst case for ∆time, (∆time - ∆) = -20δρ + e(1 + ρ) = δ(1-20ρ)]  ≈ δ. 
Note that the time-based protocol of [20], like ours, is symmetric and involves message 
diffusion and authentication. Hence the message complexity is the same for both. 
We present two remarks over the evaluation of (∆time - ∆) shown above. First, we have 
ignored a component of e which compensates the clock drift between successive adjustments. 
Since two non-faulty clocks can drift at the maximum rate of 2ρ, the missing component of e 
is 2ρI where I is the period between successive adjustments. So, for example, if ρ is taken to 
be 10-6 and I is chosen to be 8.33 minutes, the value of e to be considered for comparison 
increases by 1 millisecond. Thus, the values of (∆time - ∆) derived above hold in those contexts 
where the clocks are synchronised frequently often that 2ρI remains negligibly small. Observe 
that frequent execution of clock synchronisation increases the message traffic, pushing the 
worst case delay δ for time-based protocol to a higher value.  
Secondly, it is possible to reduce e by assigning a higher priority to clock synchronisation 
processes. This reduces the uncertainty in the delays for process scheduling and message 
queuing, thus resulting in a lower value for δ in e= δ/(1+ρ). It however has an implication on 
δ estimated for order protocol messages which now have a lower priority. Recall that the 
bound δ for order protocol messages is the maximum delay which non-faulty processors can 
possibly encounter during the entire system operation. This means that δ be estimated in the 
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most demanding scenario where the maximal set of higher priority processes are transmitting 
simultaneously.  Thus, assigning a higher priority to synchronisation processes, while 
reducing δ for synchronisation messages, tends to increase δ for (time-based) order protocol 
messages. 
6.1 Conditions Favouring Timeout Approach 
We identify some favourable conditions in which our protocol works faster than the time 
based one. We define λ as the maximum difference within which non-faulty processors 
receive a given input from the environment and da as the actual maximum transmission delay 
that currently holds within the system. λ is typically called tightness [22] and will be small 
when inputs from the system environment are received via a broadcast LAN as shown in 
Figure 1; when the system is lightly loaded, da is much smaller than d (the worst-case 
estimate). 
Suppose that all processors within the TMR system are non-faulty, and an input µ is first 
received by a processor at real-time τ.  For simplicity, we will ignore the effect of non-zero ρ 
for the durations considered here. By τ + λ, all processors must have formed and broadcast a 
message containing µ. By τ + λ + 2da, Pi accepts two double-signed messages m’ and m” 
such that path(m’) = Pj:Pk, path(m”) = Pk:Pj and m’.µ = m”.µ = µ; without loss of generality, 
let us assume: m’.TS ≤ m”.TS. After τ + λ + 2da + 2d, Pi will not accept  
(i) any double-signed m with m.TS ≤ m’.TS and path(m) = Pj:Pk due to having accepted 
m’ before τ + λ + 2da and due to the entry D3 of Table 1, and  
(ii) any double-signed m with m.TS ≤ m”.TS and path(m) = Pk:Pj due to having accepted 
m” before τ + λ + 2da and due to the entry E5 of Table 1. 
Therefore m’, m’.TS ≤ m”.TS, becomes stable at Pi by τ + λ + 2da + 2d; i.e. every Pi 
orders input µ contained within m’ by τ + λ + 2da + 2d. When one of the processors is faulty, 
a similar reasoning indicates that non-faulty processors will order µ by τ + λ + da + 3d.  
With the time based protocol, non-faulty processors can order µ at or before  τ + 2(d + e) 
and the explanation is as follows. Let Pi first receive the input (from the environment) at τ. 
The message formed and broadcast by Pi will be ordered by Pi at  τ + 2(d + e ) and by other 
processors at some time in [τ + (2d + e), τ + (2d + 3e)]. Assuming the best case (and in favour 
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of the time-based approach), we will regard that all other processors order at or before 
τ + (2d + e). Hence the maximum delay incurred for ordering the input is 2(d + e). Our 
protocol is guaranteed to order the inputs faster in the following situation: 
i. processors receive their inputs via a broadcast LAN which facilitates nearly 
simultaneous input arrival at all processors; 
ii. no special hardware support nor external assistance is available for synchronising 
clocks, leaving e comparable to d, the worst case communication delay envisaged;  
iii.   the system is lightly loaded and message processing and queuing delays are small – 
leaving da and λ very small compared to d, such that λ + 2da < 2e when no processor 
is faulty and λ + da + d < 2e when one processor is faulty. 
6.2. Implementation and Relative Performance 
Estimation of d: Estimating d requires making an assumption on the maximum number 
of clients which can simultaneously send an input at a given time. We fixed this to be 10. To 
estimate d, a provisional estimate dpro was first made as follows: 10 clients were made to 
issue their requests (to all three processors) at the same time. All messages were assumed to 
be timely and authentic, and therefore there was no message verification delay. The 
experiment ran until all clients had sent 1000 requests of 64 bytes. The maximum observed 
delay became dpro which did not include the delay component due to maintaining path 
counters and performing timeliness checks on received messages. In the next stage, the 
experiment was repeated, using dpro as the value for d, for both time and timeout based 
protocols, but now the protocols ran according to their complete description. The final value 
of d was chosen to be 10% more than the maximum observed delay, to account for inputs of 
size larger than 64 bytes. 
Experimental Set-up: Since the clocks were synchronised frequently, e was taken to be 
d itself. We measured the input ordering delay (IOD) as the interval from the instance an 
input is first received by a non-faulty processor to the instant when at least two non-faulty 
processors are known to have ordered a message containing that input. To measure the 
average IOD, we ran a set of experiments in which one client sent a batch of 10 requests 100 
times sequentially. (This emulates the situation of 10 clients accessing the system at different 
times.)  Processors processed an ordered input by echoing it back to the client with a 
sequence number which should be identical for non-faulty processors.  
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The experiments were carried out in two different settings: the TMR processors were (i) 
T800 Inmos transputers [28] connected directly to each other by fast links (as shown in fig.1), 
and (ii) Pentium II 233 MHz PC’s with 64MB of memory running the Linux 2.2.14 operating 
system and connected by a 100Mbits/sec fast ethernet. Thus, we consider  two architectures 
commonly used for inter-processor communication: point-to-point and bus based. Further, the 
second implementation was done using Java (on Linux) – in a multithreaded environment 
where thread scheduling is a source of non-determinism which should not be allowed to 
affect the deterministic behaviour of replicas. We ensured this by implementing the order 
process – which makes the ordered delivery of stable messages - in a single thread.  
Experimental Results: With Transputers, the values of d and λ were 50 ms 
(milliseconds) and 13.15 ms, respectively (and e = d). With all processors being non-faulty, 
the average values were: da = 9.18 ms; the IOD for the timeout protocol, IODTo = 136.28 ms, 
and that for the time-based, IODTime = 202.83 ms. With one processor crashed, da = 5.87 ms, 
IODTo = 163.88 ms, and IODTime = 202.75 ms. Observe that when the crashed processor is not 
participating in the protocol, da reduces but little change occurs to IODTime. The reduction in 
da is due to the reduced number of messages to be handled when one processor crashes: when 
there is no failure, each processor has to handle, for each client request, five messages (one 
directly from the client and two sets of two equivalent messages with each set originating 
from a given co-processor); this figure drops to two when one processor is crashed. Thus, a 
single crash results in 60% drop in the number of messages to be handled by an operational 
processor. (See [29, 18] for more experiments in the Transputer context.) 
In the second, bus-based experimental set-up, the value chosen for d was 121 ms and λ was 
observed to be 11 ms. 99% of the delays observed were in the range [90, 105] ms when there 
were 10 clients, and in the range [60, 75] for a single client. The frequently-encountered 
delays being smaller than the chosen d helps the timeout protocol to be faster than the time-
based protocol, as the Table below shows.  
Clients IODTo (No failure) IODTo (One crash) IODTime (No failure) IODTime (One crash) 
1 387 388 501 501 
2 391 394 501 500 
3 380 390 500 501 
4 388 393 500 500 
5 390 396 500 500 
10 451 457 500 500 
Table 2. Input ordering delays in a bus-based environment. 
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Observe that IODTo increases only very slightly when a processor is crashed. Let us use 
subscripts 0 and 1 to differentiate the estimates made when no processor and one processor is 
crashed, respectively. So,  IODTo,0 = λ + 2da,0 + 2d.  and IODTo,1 = λ + da,1 + 3d. Recall that 
when a processor is crashed, the number of messages handled by a working processor drops 
by 60%. In a bus-based system, this also means a reduction in processors competing for bus 
access which often leads to a non-linear reduction in message transmission delays. Our 
measurements suggest that (2da,0  - da,1)  ≈ d.  Finally, the small difference of IODTime over 
the theoretical estimate (of 2(d + e) = 4d) is attributed to the cost of thread scheduling in Java 
for delivering the ordered messages to the application process. 
7.  Related Work and Concluding Remarks 
To our knowledge, the problem of message ordering in a distributed context was first 
addressed by Lamport [21]. We owe our use of message counters (MCs) in our protocol to his 
paper. The protocol in [21] is not fault-tolerant and is for an asynchronous context where any 
estimated bounds on processing, scheduling, and communication delays can be violated.  For 
an equivalent problem of reaching agreement, Pease et. al. [1] provided synchronous time-
based protocols for the least restrictive fault models of unauthenticated and authenticated 
Byzantine faults; they also showed that at least four processors are needed to contain one 
faulty processor when authentication is not employed. Among the works that ensued in the 
synchronous and time-based context, the following results are significant: protocols of [24, 
25, 26] made internal clock synchronisation possible even for Byzantine fault models; even in 
the absence of faults, e cannot be guaranteed to be less than one half of the worst case delays 
expected for synchronisation messages [7]; reaching agreement simultaneously by non-faulty 
processors, necessary for identical message ordering, requires at least (f+1) rounds of message 
diffusion if f is the maximum number of faults expected [16]. Cristian et. al. [20] proposed a 
suite of ordering protocols for a range of fault models, the weakest being the authenticated 
Byzantine.  
In the domain of synchronous timeout approach, [9] and AMp of [10] are worth 
mentioning. The former is an asymmetric protocol and assumes, like us, an authenticated 
Byzantine model within a TMR system; further, it assumes every client to be a TMR system 
as well and solves the problem of message ordering together with majority voting of inputs. 
AMp was developed with commercial applications in mind, and provides the same message 
ordering guarantees as our protocol in a general n-processor system but assumes a benign 
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fault model where processors either crash or occasionally omit to produce responses. Our 
assumption of authenticated Byzantine faults is weaker and, as argued in [1], any further 
weakening of our fault model makes the desired form of message ordering impossible in a 
three-processor system. 
In the asynchronous model, the processing, the scheduling, and communication delays 
are only known to be finite but their (upper) bounds cannot be known with certainty. 
Consequently, no deterministic message ordering protocol can be guaranteed to terminate 
even if one processor can crash [30]. This impossibility stems from the inherent difficulty in 
determining whether a remote processor has crashed or is only very slow. That is, since the 
asynchronous model permits any prior estimates of bounds to be violated, a fault-tolerant 
deterministic protocol cannot be guaranteed to terminate. It can only guarantee correctness 
without liveliness: if non-faulty processes order a given message, they do so identically. This 
is in contrast to synchronous protocols which require the bounds to be inviolable; if violations 
undermine the fault hypothesis, a synchronous protocol will terminate within the guaranteed 
time period, but can cause non-faulty processors to order messages differently. Stating a 
precise set of requirements for eventual termination, asynchronous protocols such as [31] and 
[32] solve the ordering problem for non-Byzantine fault models, and [17] for the 
authenticated Byzantine model. These requirements generally warrant the violations of the 
assumed bounds to be below a threshold for a sufficiently long time.  
In this paper, we have developed a synchronous timeout-based, ordering protocol for a 
TMR system. It borrows its structure from its time-based counterpart (thereby having the 
same message complexity) and replaces the synchronised time base with Lamport’s logical 
clocks [21] and unsynchronised physical clocks. Where it required considerable design effort 
was in reducing the timeliness bounds by carefully analysing the various paths through which 
a processor can receive a message. This made the ordering delays smaller and the protocol 
optimal among the symmetric, timeout based protocols. The reductions achieved made use of 
the structure of the TMR system: there are only three processors of which at most one can 
fail. It is not clear whether the conservative bounds can be sufficiently reduced in a general 
system of n processors with at most f faults, to yield a smaller worst-case delay. This remains 
an open problem. 
We have identified the contexts in which our protocol performs worse/better than the 
time-based protocol. When the synchronisation accuracy achieved is very small compared to 
the worst case message communication delays, time based approach is twice as fast as ours. 
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Where these two are nearly equal, as would be the case when clocks are synchronised with no 
assistance from special hardware or an external time source, our protocol offers a choice. We 
have identified analytically, and justified experimentally, the conditions in which our protocol 
orders inputs faster. Such conditions hold when the prevailing conditions of message traffic, 
failure and failure type within the system are less, or less severe, than the worst case 
conditions envisaged for the system. For example, as our experiments show, when the 
number of clients simultaneously accessing the system is less than the expected, the actual 
communication delays are certainly less than the estimated bound; similarly, no processor 
may fail for a considerable part of the TMR operation and even the failure occurred may be of 
type crash instead of the supposed Byzantine. Thus, in addition to deriving a timeout based 
protocol, the paper presents a practical alternative to time-based protocol when the achievable 
clock-synchronisation accuracy is comparable to the worst-case message communication 
delay envisaged. 
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Appendix A. Timeliness Bound C3 
In Section 4.3.2, we claimed that the entry C3 in Table 1 can be 3d (instead of the 
conservative bound 4d). We here show this by first proving the following lemma. 
Lemma A1: Let t1 and t2 be the local clock times when a non-faulty Pi receives a single-
signed m1 and a double-signed m2, respectively; also, let m1.TS ≤ m2.TS and t1 > t2. If Pi 
finds m1 timely then it must also find m2 timely. 
Proof: We will measure time according to Pi’s local clock and prove the lemma by 
contradiction. Suppose that Pi finds m1 timely and m2 late. Let m2 be late by y, y > 0, time 
units, i.e., if Pi had received m2 at any time before (t2 - y) then it would have found m2 timely. 
(See figure A1.) That m2 received at t2 was found late implies that there exists a message m’, 
m’.TS ≥ m2.TS, which was accepted by Pi at (t2 - y - tb2), where tb2 is the timeliness bound 
indicated by the entry of table 1 whose row corresponds to the path(m’) and column to the 
path(m2). Let tb1 be the timeliness bound indicated by the entry of table 1 whose row 
corresponds to the path(m’) and column to the path(m1). 
Since m1.TS ≤ m2.TS ≤ m’.TS, m1 must be received by Pi before (t2 - y - tb2 + tb1) for it 
to be considered timely. For any given path(m’), i.e. in any given row of Table 1, the 
timeliness bound for a single-signed message is smaller than that for a double-signed-
message. That is, tb1 < tb2. This means, (t2 - y - tb2 + tb1) < t2; by given, t2 < t1. So, t1 > (t2 - 
y - tb2 + tb1). This means that m1 is received by Pi after (t2 - y - tb2 + tb1) and cannot be 
found timely by Pi. This is a contradiction.        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A1. m1.TS ≤ m2.TS ≤ m’.TS. 
Claim: The entry C3 of Table 1 is correct. 
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Proof: By given, path(m’) = Pj, path(m) = Pj:Pk and m’.TS ≥ m.TS. Observe that Pk here 
is
 
the non-faulty immediate sender of m and Pj can be faulty or non-faulty. (If Pj is non-faulty 
then m’.TS > m.TS.) Since Pi accepts m’ (by hypothesis), it will diffuse the message to Pk. Pk 
also diffuses m to Pi. So, there are two cases to consider: Pk receives the single-signed m 
from Pj either (i) before or (ii) after it receives the diffused m’ from Pi. The sub-case (i) is 
shown in figure A2(a). Pk can receive the diffused m’ from Pi at any time before t’ + d. Even 
if it diffuses m just before receiving m’, Pi can receive the diffused m just before t’ + d + d; 
that is, (t - t’) < 2d. 
Figure A2(b) illustrates the second sub-case where Pk receives the single-signed m from 
Pj after it has received the double-signed m’ from Pi. Since Pk diffuses m to Pi, it must have 
found the single-signed m it received as timely. By Lemma A1, Pk must find the double-
signed m’ timely. When it receives the single-signed m after having accepted the double-
signed m’, it is in the same situation as Pi in case E1 where path(m’) = Pj:Pk, path(m) = Pj 
and the timeliness bound is shown to be d in Section 4.3.2. So, for the non-faulty Pk to find 
the single-signed m timely, it must have received m within d time after it received m’ true; 
that is, the time elapsed between receiving m’ and m must be less than d. From Figure A2(b), 
(t - t’) cannot be more than 3d. Choosing the largest of the bounds estimated for the two sub-
cases, 3d becomes the timeliness bound for the entry C3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A2. (a) Pk receives m before m’. (b) Pk receives m after m’. 
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Appendix B. Protocol Optimality  
Theorem 5.2: Any symmetric ordering protocol that works only with unsynchronised 
clocks, will have executions in which the ordering delay can be 3δm + δm-. 
Proof: By contradiction. Assume that there is such a protocol which guarantees that 
ordering delays are always smaller than 3δm + δm-. Consider two distinct executions of this 
protocol during real-time intervals ι1 and ι2 respectively. By hypothesis, non-faulty 
processors’ clocks remain unsynchronised throughout each interval. (Note: By this, we 
exclude a class of protocols which permit clock synchronisation messages to be piggybacked 
onto the order protocol messages and thus achieve clock synchronisation during the order 
protocol execution.) 
In the first execution (see figure B1(a)), Pi fails only by not sending its messages to Pj 
and not receiving Pj’s messages. Pi sends mi at its clock time ti. Let mi take zero time to 
reach Pk. Suppose that Pk’s clock reads tk when Pk receives mi. (Since mi takes zero time, 
when Pk’s clock reads tk, Pi’s clock reads ti.) Let Pk accept and diffuse mi to Pj and the 
diffused message take δm time to be received by Pj. Just before Pj receives the diffused mi, 
i.e. when Pk’s clock reads tk + δm-, suppose that Pj‘s clock reads tj and that Pj forms and 
sends mj which takes δm time to be received by Pk. So, Pk’s clock reads (tk + δm- + δm) 
when Pk receives mj. Note that Pj sends mj before it receives the diffused mi from Pk; 
therefore, neither mi nor mj happened before [21] the other. Since Pk cannot deduce that mi 
originated before mj in real-time, we will assume (without loss of generality) that mj is 
ordered before mi by all non-faulty processors. 
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Figure B1. Execution Scenarios. (a) First execution. (b) Second execution. 
In the second execution (see figure B1(b)), Pj fails only by not sending its messages to Pi 
and not receiving Pi’s messages. Pi sends mi at its clock time ti. mi takes δm time to reach Pk 
and is not received by Pj. Suppose that Pk’s clock reads tk when Pk receives mi, i.e., when 
Pi’s clock reads ti + δm. (Note: this is possible with unsynchronised clocks whose readings 
can differ by an arbitrary amount.) Assume that the mi diffused by Pk takes δm time to be 
received by Pj. 
When Pk’s clock reads tk + δm-, suppose that Pj‘s clock reads tj and that Pj forms and 
sends mj only to Pk which takes δm time to be received. That is, Pk’s clock reads 
(tk + δm- + δm) when Pk receives mj. For Pk, this execution is indistinguishable from the 
first one. (Note that since the difference between the readings of unsynchronised clocks can 
differ by an arbitrary amount, we have chosen the difference to be a convenient amount that 
allows the following claim to hold: the two executions are indistinguishable for Pk even if the 
sender of a message m timestamps m with the local send time.) So Pk must order mj before 
mi. Since ordering delays are always smaller than 3δm + δm-, non-faulty Pi must order its 
own mi before ti + 3δm + δm-. Say Pk’s diffused mj takes δm time to be received by Pi. That 
is, Pi can receive mj (for the first time), only when its clock reads ti + 3δm + δm-. So, Pi can 
receive mj only at or after ti + 3δm + δm-. Hence Pi cannot order mj before ti + 3δm + δm-, 
and therefore before mi. This violates the unanimity condition. This is a contradiction.   
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Appendix C: Timeliness Bounds and the Unanimous Acceptance Requirement 
 
We here show that the timeliness bounds satisfy the unanimous acceptance requirement 
of section 4.2 when d ≥ δ/(1 - 5ρ). This is done in two stages: lemma B1 proves that a non-
faulty processor always finds another non-faulty processor’s 1-signed message timely; and 
lemma B3 shows that when a non-faulty processor diffuses a 2-signed message to another 
non-faulty processor, the latter finds the diffused message timely. As in the main paper, we 
adopt the style of writing real time values in Greek and clock time values in italicised lower 
case Roman letters. The term ‘clock’ always refers to a processor’s physical clock. 
We assume the following notations: STARTi(p,≥T) denotes the smallest real time 
instance when PCi[p] for path p becomes larger than or equal to T, T ≥ INIT_VAL. That is, 
just before real time STARTi(p,≥T), PCi[p] is less than T. ENDi(≤T) denotes the largest real 
time instance when MCi is less than or equal to T. That is, just after real time ENDi(≤T), MCi 
is larger than T and Pi will not form and send any m, m.T ≤ T. We also retain the notation ρi, 
|ρi| ≤ ρ, to denote the rate with which the clock of a processor Pi drifts from real time. 
Lemma B0: Say a non-faulty Pi accepts m at real time τi. If m is not signed by a non-faulty 
Pk, Pk then receives m or equiv(m) at real time τk such that τk < τi + δ. 
Proof: If m is Pi’s own message, Pi is required to send m to both Pj and Pk. If m is signed by 
Pj, Pi is required to diffuse double-signed equiv(m) to Pk. By assumption 4, Pk then receives 
m or equiv(m) before τi + δ.          
Lemma B1: When a non-faulty Pk forms and sends m, another non-faulty Pi finds m timely, 
provided d ≥ δ/(1 - ρ). 
Proof: By lemma B0, Pi receives m or equiv(m) within δ real-time after Pk sends m. Say, 
m.TS = T. If Pi has not accepted any message with timestamp larger than or equal to T until it 
receives m, then MCi ≤ T when it receives m and Pi finds m timely. Let us suppose that MCi 
is already larger than T when Pi receives m. Since Pi has accepted one or more messages with 
timestamp larger than or equal to T, there must exist a message, say m’, m’.TS ≥ T, whose 
acceptance causes Pi to set PCi[Pk] ≥ T at real time STARTi(Pk,≥T). If we show that 
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STARTi(Pk,≥T) - ENDk(≤T) ≥ δ for every possible path(m’), then the lemma is proved. We 
present the proof by categorising the values of path(m’) in two cases. For each case, we 
construct the proof in the following manner. We define τi to be the real time when Pi accepts 
m’ and α = STARTi(Pk,≥T) - τi. (Figure B1 shows these values along the real-time axis for 
Pi.) We derive two inequalities – inequality (1) involving τi and ENDk(≤T) and inequality (2) 
involving τi and STARTi(Pk,≥T). We then relate these two inequalities through the common 
element τi, to show what is required. 
 
 
 
 
Figure B1. Pi accepting m’ at τi sets PCi(Pk) ≥ T at STARTi(Pk,≥T). 
Case I. path(m’) = Pk or Pk:Pj or Pj:Pk. Just before sending m’, m’.TS ≥ T, Pk sets MCk 
to m’.TS + 1. Therefore, 
ENDk(≤T) ≤ τi    (I.1). 
For all the considered values of path(m’), α = d(1 + ρi). (See entries B1, E1 and D1 of table 
1.) So, 
STARTi(Pk,≥T) = τi + d(1 + ρi)   (I.2). 
Thus, combining (I.1) and (I.2) we have 
STARTi(Pk,≥T) ≥ ENDk(≤T) + d(1 + ρi). 
Since d ≥ δ/(1 - ρ) implies d(1 + ρi) ≥ δ, we have 
STARTi(Pk,≥T) - ENDk(≤T) ≥ δ. 
Case II. path(m’) = Pj or Pi. Let Pk receive m’ (when path(m’) = Pi) or equiv(m’) (when 
path(m’) = Pj) from Pi, at real time τk. By lemma B0, τk < τi + δ. Just before τk, we have 
either MCk ≤ T or MCk > T. In the first case ENDk(≤T) = τk, and in the latter case 
ENDk(≤T) < τk. So, 
ENDk(≤T) - δ < τi    (II.1). 
accept m’ Pi 
STARTi(Pk,≥T) 
α 
τi PCi[Pk] < T) PCi[Pk] ≥ T) 
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From entries A1 and C1 of table 1, α = 2d(1 + ρi). So, 
STARTi(Pk,≥T) = τi + 2d(1 + ρi)   (II.2). 
Combining (II.1) and (II.2) we have 
STARTi(Pk,≥T) > ENDk(≤T) - δ + 2d(1 + ρi). 
When d ≥ δ/(1 - ρ), 2d(1 + ρi) ≥ 2δ, thus 
STARTi(Pk,≥T) - ENDk(≤T) ≥ δ.     
Lemma B2: STARTi(Pj:Pk,≥T) ≥ STARTi(Pj,≥T) for a non-faulty Pi and T ≥ INIT_VAL. 
Proof: Let m’, m’.TS ≥ T be the message whose acceptance at time τ causes Pi to set 
PCi[Pj:Pk] ≥ T at STARTi(Pj:Pk,≥T). From table 1, τ ≥ STARTi(Pj:Pk,≥T) – 2d(1 + ρi); also, 
from the protocol in figure 2, Pi will schedule an update of PCi[Pj] to at least m’.TS at latest 
by τ +2d(1 + ρi), thus STARTi(Pk,≥T) ≤ τ + 2d(1 + ρi), and since d > 0, 
STARTi(Pj:Pk,≥T) ≥ STARTi(Pk,≥T).         
Lemma B3: When a non-faulty Pi diffuses a double-signed m to non-faulty Pk, Pk finds m 
timely, provided d ≥ δ/(1 - 5ρ). 
Proof: As in lemma B1, we will let m.TS = T and suppose that MCk is already larger than T 
when Pk receives m. Since Pk has accepted message(s) with timestamp larger than or equal to 
T, there must exist a message, say m’, m’.TS ≥ T, whose acceptance causes Pk to set 
PCk[Pj:Pi] ≥ T at real time STARTk(Pj:Pi,≥T). Let τk be the real time when Pk accepts m’ 
and α = STARTk(Pj:Pi,≥T) - τk. Figure B2 shows these values along the real-time axis for Pk. 
 
 
 
 
Figure B2. Pk accepting m’ at τk sets PCk(Pj:Pi) ≥ T at STARTk(Pj:Pi,≥T). 
Note that Pi must have diffused m to Pk before STARTi(Pj,≥T), and that Pk will find m 
timely if it receives m before STARTk(Pj:Pi,≥T). We need only to show that 
STARTk(Pj:Pi,≥T) - STARTi(Pj,≥T) ≥ δ for every possible path(m’). We show this by 
accept m’ Pk 
STARTk(Pj:Pi,≥T) 
α 
τk PCk[Pj:Pi] < T) PCk[Pj:Pi] ≥ T) 
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considering three cases regarding the originator of m’, m’.O. In all cases, there is a real time 
τi when Pi either sends m’ or receives equiv(m’); in the same way we did to prove lemma B1, 
for each case we construct two inequalities: inequality (3) involving τi and 
STARTk(Pj:Pi,≥T), and inequality 4 involving τi and STARTi(Pj,≥T). These equalities are 
then related through τi to show what is required. 
We first present the timeliness bounds that a non-faulty Pk uses to check the timeliness 
of a message m it receives. They are presented in the same way that we did before for a non-
faulty Pi, and are obtained simply by interchanging the suffixes k and i in table 1. Table B1 
shows the timeliness bounds used by Pk. 
 
 path(m) 
path(m’) 
Pi (1) Pj (2) Pj:Pi (3) Pi:Pj (4) 
Pk           (A) 2d 2d 4d 4d 
Pi            (B) d 2d 3d 3d 
Pj            (C) 2d d 3d 3d 
Pj:Pi        (D) d d 2d 3d 
Pi:Pj        (E) d d 3d 2d 
Table B1: Pk’s timeliness bounds for a past m given that MCk first exceeded m.TS due to accepting m’. 
Case I. m’.O = Pk. From entry A3 of table B1, α = 4d(1 + ρk) and Pk must have formed 
and sent m’ at real time STARTk(Pj:Pi,≥T) - 4d(1 + ρk). Let Pi receive m’ at τi, by lemma B0, 
τi < STARTk(Pj:Pi,≥T) - 4d(1 + ρk) + δ  (I.3). 
From lemma B1, Pi accepts m’; so from entry B2 of table 1, we have 
STARTi(Pj,≥T) ≤ τi + 2d(1 + ρi)   (I.4). 
Combining (I.3) and (I.4) we have 
STARTi(Pj,≥T) < STARTk(Pj:Pi,≥T) - 4d(1 + ρk) + δ + 2d(1 + ρi), and 
STARTk(Pj:Pi,≥T) - STARTi(Pj,≥T) > 2d(1 + 2ρk - ρi) - δ 
which leads to 
STARTk(Pj:Pi,≥T) - STARTi(Pj,≥T) > δ, 
whenever d ≥ δ/(1 + 2ρk - ρi), which is always true since d ≥ δ/(1 - 5ρ) > δ/(1 + 2ρk - ρi). 
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Case II. m’.O = Pi. Note that the m’ that Pk accepts can be single or double-signed. Let 
Pi form and send m’ (if m’ is single-signed) or the single-signed equiv(m’) (if m’ is double-
signed) at real time τi. Whether m’ is single or double-signed, the entries B3 and E3 of table 
B1 indicate that α = 3d(1 + ρk). Since τi ≤ τk, 
τi ≤ STARTk(Pj:Pi,≥T) - 3d(1 + ρk)   (II.3). 
From entry A2 of table 1 
STARTi(Pj,≥T) ≤ τi + 2d(1 + ρi)   (II.4). 
Combining (II.3) and (II.4) we have 
STARTi(Pj,≥T) ≤ STARTk(Pj:Pi,≥T) - 3d(1 + ρk) + 2d(1 + ρi), and 
STARTk(Pj:Pi,≥T) - STARTi(Pj,≥T) ≥ d(1 + 3ρk - 2ρi) 
which leads to 
STARTk(Pj:Pi,≥T) - STARTi(Pj,≥T) ≥ δ, 
whenever d ≥ δ/(1 + 3ρk - 2ρi), which is true since d ≥ δ/(1 - 5ρ) ≥ δ/(1 + 3ρk - 2ρi). 
Case III: m’.O = Pj. Say path(m’) = Pj. From entry C3 of table B1, α = 3d(1 + ρk). Let Pi 
receive the diffused equiv(m’) from Pk at real time τi; from lemma B0, 
τi < STARTk(Pj:Pi,≥T) - 3d(1 + ρk) + δ   (III.3a). 
If Pi accepts equiv(m’) at τi, then from entry D2 of table 1, τi ≥ STARTi(Pj,≥T) - d(1 + ρi); 
otherwise, τi > STARTi(Pj:Pk,≥T) and from lemma B2, τi > STARTi(Pj,≥T). Since d > 0, in 
both cases we have 
STARTi(Pj,≥T) ≤ τi + d(1 + ρi)   (III.4a). 
Combining (III.3a) and (III.4a), we get 
STARTi(Pj,≥T) < STARTk(Pj:Pi,≥T) - 3d(1 + ρk) + δ + d(1 + ρi), and 
STARTk(Pj:Pi,≥T) - STARTi(Pj,≥T) > 2d(1 + 3ρk/2 - ρi/2) - δ, 
which leads to 
STARTk(Pj:Pi,≥T) - STARTi(Pj,≥T) > δ, 
whenever d ≥ δ/(1 + 3ρk/2 - ρi/2), which is true since d ≥ δ/(1 - 5ρ) > δ/(1 + 3ρk/2 - ρi/2). 
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Say path(m’) = Pj:Pi. α = 2d(1 + ρk) from entry D3 of table B1. Let Pi diffuse m’ to Pk 
at real time τi. Since τi ≤ τk, 
τi ≤ STARTk(Pj:Pi,≥T) - 2d(1 + ρk)   (III.3b). 
From entry C2 of table 1, 
STARTi(Pj,≥T) ≤ τi + d(1 + ρi)   (III.4b). 
Combining (III.3b) and (III.4b) we get 
STARTi(Pj,≥T) ≤ STARTk(Pj:Pi,≥T) - 2d(1 + ρk) + d(1 + ρi), and 
STARTk(Pj:Pi,≥T) - STARTi(Pj,≥T) ≥ d(1 + 2ρk - ρi), 
which leads to 
STARTk(Pj:Pi,≥T) - STARTi(Pj,≥T) ≥ δ, 
whenever d ≥ δ/(1 + 2ρk - ρi), which is true since d ≥ δ/(1 - 5ρ) > δ/(1 + 2ρk - ρi).  
 
 
 
